Deontic ‘cocktail’ according to E. Mally’s receipt by Elena, Lisanyuk
Deontic ‘cocktail’ according to E.
Mally’s receipt1
Elena N. Lisanyuk
abstract. In 1926, Ernst Mally, an Austrian logician, has
introduced a system of deontic logic in which he has proposed
three fundamental distinctions which proved to be important in
the context of the further development of the logic of norms. It
is argued that in his philosophical considerations Mally has in-
troduced a number of important distinctions concerning the very
concept of norm, but by getting them confused in introducing the
subsequent formalisms he failed to formally preserve them. In
some of his philosophically made distinctions Mally apparently
foresaw contemporary trends in logic of norms. To some extent
this particular feature of Mally’s system open wide opportunities
to reconstruct –– with the corresponding renovations — his ill-
formed Deontik into many nowadays known systems of logic of
norms and thus provides a fertile ground for this kind of research.
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1 Introduction
Conceptual considerations about developing a special kind of logic
capable to model norms and reasoning about norms date back at
least to the Middle Ages, but it was not until von Wright’s deontic
systems have been introduced in 1951 that the ﬁrst a viable and
sound system of deontic logic was proposed. Standard von Wright-
type deontic logic which was thus launched has developed into one
of the most signiﬁcant trends in the area of logic of norms, although
not without being criticized [2], [3]. Among those criticisms, the
most troublesome seemed to be the so called paradoxes of absolute
1Research is supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research,
project № 11-06-00206.
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deontic logic that targeted one of the central concepts of standard
deontic logic, namely the concept of deontically perfect state of
aﬀairs, the one in which all norms are assumed to be fulﬁlled [4, p.
401]. Today, when diverse trends in this area have emerged, these
paradoxes are regarded to be characteristic rather of the type of
deontic system, than of the logic of norms as a part of contemporary
logic [7, p. 172].
As a logical investigation of normative reasoning, or reasoning in
the framework of normative systems, logic of norms is constantly
moving towards more adequate norms understanding which is ob-
tained in the framework of their formal representation. In the very
beginning of its development, the goal of norms’ formal represen-
tation was thought to be achieved by means of deontic calculi,
that later have been supplemented by standard semantic structures,
which yet later has proved to be in many aspects inadequate [5, p.
148]. Contemporary normative formalisms tend to regard seman-
tic aspects of norms as more fundamental then inferential relations
among them.
Both the structure of norm and as well as the relations established
between the elements of it are assumed as relevant for being modeled
by means of a logical theory. For this reason, they form one of the
key issues in deﬁning norm in the sense of logic. Norms consist of
four basic elements [4, p. 380]:
1) actions, or states of aﬀairs, which can be;
2) (according to norm character) allowed, prescribed or prohib-
ited from being performed by agents;
3) agents as subjects of norms;
4) conditions (actions or states of aﬀairs) for norms’ emerging or
ceasing.
Deontic logic proper regards (1) and (2) as more fundamental
for logical investigations about norms and for this reason it may be
called ‘objectivist’ trend in the logic of norms. Deontic logic pursues
logical aspects of the relations between (1) and (2), on the one hand,
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and norms’ obedience or disobedience, on the other. This ‘objec-
tivist’ approach relies to a large extent on an assumption that proper
understood norms are impersonal timeless absolute (condition-free)
regulations. In this way, norms, when they are obeyed, generate
a normatively ideal (perfect) state of aﬀairs, or deontically ideal
world. According to the deontic approach, norms proper may enter
conditional regulations becoming thus the elements of them together
with (3), (4), temporal, epistemic and other modalities, but this fact
does not preclude deontic theories from studying their central con-
cept of normative relation between (1)–(2) and deontically perfect
worlds.2
Indeterministic agent-dependent logic of norms regards issues
(3)–(4) as more signiﬁcant than (1)–(2) and is a major contemporary
rival of deontic logic. Norms’ analysts belonging to this trend see
the relation between agent, (3), and its strategy in goal-oriented ac-
tivities as key issue for studying human beings’ normative behavior
in which deontically understood norms (1)–(2) form a correlative
element of agent’s strategy. Indeterministic logic of norms stems
out of von Wright’s ideas of logic of action [3] and A. Prior’s theory
of branching time [17], [18] and is being developed in the works of
J. Horty [11], N. Belnap [9] and others.
Indeterministic logical theories of obligation introduce special
stit-operator of agency which may be understood in diﬀerent ways
depending on the interpretations of concepts of history, time and
moment [8], all of them are related to agent’s actions. These theo-
ries incorporate two important ideas concerning logical analysis of
agency. The ﬁrst is that of agent’s ability to do something as closely
related to both what an agent ought to do and what should have
done. J. Horty calls it MeinongnChisholm analysis and reports that
it can be traced back to the works of some German and Austrian
philosophers [11, p. 44–46]. The other one explicitly marks the
borderline distinction between SDL altogether with its further de-
velopments and indeterministic theories and proposes the concepts
of branching time and corresponding linear histories as intrinsic to
agent’s behavior in such a way that the latter is assumed to be de-
pendent of agent’s previously made choices in the way that it secures
2See [7] for a substantial exposition of deontic logic proper.
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its freedom in what concerns its future choices. Contrary to that,
SDL as well as its contemporary versions rely on certain determined
future state of aﬀairs thus leaving no room for agent’s future choices
otherwise than being caused by those previously made.
In this paper, some arguments are proposed to support of the
idea that Austrian logician Ernst Mally should be added to the
list of those German-speaking philosophers whose conceptual con-
siderations of the issue gave rise to the idea of agent-dependent
normativity. It is also suggested that in his Deontik Mally was the
ﬁrst to introduce a deontically understood agential ought as distinct
from agent-free impersonal obligation, though, apparently, did it in
somewhat vague way.
2 Who is Mally?
Ernst Mally (1879–1944), an Austrian logician, a pupil of Alexius
Meinong and the author of several philosophical writings, was born
in Slovenia which then has been a part of Austro-Hungarian Empire.
In 1926 Mally published a book Grundgesetze des Sollens: Elemente
der Logik des Willens (‘The Basic Laws of Ought: Elements of
the Logic of Willing’) [16] in which he proposed a logical theory
which happened to become the ﬁrst approach to formulate a system
of deontic logic. Ernst Mally called his theory Deontik and thus
became the author of the both, the ﬁrst system of deontic logic and
the term for this branch of logic.
As a viable formalism, his system has proved to be unsuccessful.
Mally‘s book is almost 100 pages long but the chapter in which
the calculi is proposed is hardly longer than 15 pages and then
throughout other 15 pages 35 theorems are given followed by
concise explanations. In the rest of his book, Chapters III and
IV, he pursues the surprising consequences his system yields. In
doing so he notoriously tries to show that the reason for those
strange consequences to follow has to be looked for not in the
axiomatic basis of the system, but instead in the properties of logic
of obligation and will itself, or in the idea of pure ethics which he
advocates in his book.
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E. Mally held very radical national socialist views during the whole of
his life. He was a teenager when he has joined one of Austrian radical
movements, later he became a member of an Austrian radical society that
have been supporting the idea of the Anschluss of Austria to Germany
even before the World War I, and joined NSDAP immediately after it
had happenned. He was an active Nazi-party member and in most of his
papers written during the last decade of his life he argues for the Nazi
ideology [22].
Yet despite these ‘hard’ facts of his biography his philosophical and
logical heritage never fully went into oblivion as one may well be inclined
to think. His intellectual life is usually divided into 3 stages. The ﬁrst
stage was devoted to the object theory [21], [6]. During the second Mally
studied various philosophical issues sometimes with the help of the object
theory, and the third saw his politically oriented writings. The book
in which his Deontik is proposed belongs to the second period and was
written before he has started to pursue his political activities also in the
philosophical papers. Despite the fact that his system has turned out
to be ill-formed, and, perhaps even because of it, Mally’s deontic logic
remained being mentioned whenever the issue of the starting point of the
development in this area of deontic logic has been touched. However, in
most cases the mentioning is being done in the sense of unsuccessful start.
Unlike his teacher, A. Meinong, Ernst Mally has founded no philo-
sophical school, yet he had several pupils. One of them, Karl Wolf, in
collaboration with his pupil, Paul Weingartner, in 1971 prepared and
published the modern edition of E. Mally’s Grundgesetze des Sollens:
Elemente der Logik des Willens [16] with the substantial philosophical
foreword.
The company of Mally’s critics includes many outstanding logici-
ans that have essentially contributed to the ﬁeld of logic of norms:
K. Menger, who was the ﬁrst to attack Deontik, G.von Wright [2],
[3]; D. Follesdal and R. Hilpinen [10], J. Wolensky [20]. O. Weinber-
ger [19] suggests an outline of Mally’s system; J.-G. Lokhorst pro-
posed several reconstructions of Mally’s Deontik along with some
critical renovations [12], [13], [14], [15].
According to most of them, there are three main reasons res-
ponsible for Mally’s logical failure. As Lokhorst summarizes them
in [12] these are (1) the classical two-valued propositional calculus
which forms the non-deontic part of Mally’s system and (2) the fact
that some deontic axioms are vague and need modiﬁcations, and (3)
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both (1)–(2). (1) is the issue particularly criticized by K. Menger,
and is also touched upon by Lokhorst, too:
If Mally’s deontic principles are added to a system in which the
so-called paradoxes of material and strict implication are avoided,
many of the ‘surprising’ theorems (such as (34) and (35)) are no
longer derivable and A$ !A is no longer derivable either. But most
of the theorems which Mally regarded as ‘plausible’ are still derivable.
The resulting system is closely related to Anderson’s relevant deontic
logic [12].
3 Mally and Jorgensen’s dilemma
Throughout his book Mally neither explicitly speciﬁes the non-
deontic part of his system, nor he accepts any propositional tau-
tologies as belonging to his system. Thus, it would be unfair to
maintain as Lokhorst does [12] that Mally proposes a (classical)
propositional basis for his system in the way von Wright or later
deontic logicians did and that has become quite standard in the
second half of XX century [5].
Instead, we ﬁnd a number of philosophical explanations concern-
ing the nature of implication from which one may conclude that
he clearly distinguishes his system as the logic of what is thinkable
(Denklogik) or the object logic (Gegenstandlogik) from the system
suggested in Principia Mathematica by Russell and Whitehead.3 He
holds the view that the latter describes the logical relations between
propositions understood as propositional functions and calls it lo-
gistics (Logistik) [16, p. 236, 320 (notes 4–6)]. Mally purports to
make this distinction as sharp as possible, especially in the chapters
III and IV of his book where he notoriously advocates his ill-formed
system. In doing so he believes that willing and obligatoriness are
conceptual objects that have their special logic which is diﬀerent
from what he calls logistic [16, p. 237]. Unfortunately, whereas in
his philosophical explanations Mally indeed draws this distinction
between the two kinds of logic, in his formalism he gets them con-
fused. This is one of several confusions made in the Deontik that
apparently led to the failure of the system.
3See also [6] on this point.
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Another confusion in his book follows immediately out of the
one just discussed. In the same way as with the kinds of logic,
Mally says that a rigor distinction should be made between the
kinds of implications that hold in case of propositions and in case of
objects, or states of aﬀairs (Sachverhalt), respectively. A impliziert
B (A implies B)4 and A fordert B (A demands B)5 are distinct
from each other and are meant to be propositional and normative
respectively.6 The former is apparently truth-functional and close
to what one may call material implication, whereas the latter looks
more like formal implication [16, note 31]. Consequently, in what
concerns (1) Mally did go wrong but not in the way diagnosed by
K. Menger or J.-G. Lokhorst, but rather in the other way round. He
has put the two distinct types of inferential relations into one system
and thereby has got diﬀerent ontological assumptions confused, and
he did so by applying the truth-functional propositional patterns
of logical inferences to propositions he himself takes in diﬀerent,
sometimes prescriptive, sense.
It seems that in these wrongly understood inferential relations
among propositions expressing norms Mally indeed had been the
ﬁrst to overlook the problem [2, p. 291] which later has been called
4The relation of implication is a relation between propositions describing two
states of aﬀairs, A and B respectively, that are understood or take place in such
a way that A implies B, but this relation is not the one to be found between
propositions expressing what is being thought or willed or ought to be, explains
E.Mally before he turns to outline his system. From the fact that the state of
aﬀairs A does not happen any other state of aﬀairs follow and an actual state
of aﬀairs is implied by whatsoever state of aﬀairs [16, p. 238–240].
5‘When something is being desired, everything in absence of which this vo-
lition may not realize, is being also desired. This is the essence of the volition.’
[16, p. 246]. ‘It lies in the very essence of willing that willing is just willing
whatsoever that willing implies. . . It has happened to everyone that in some un-
foreseen circumstances in which one ﬁnds oneself to be obliged to apologize for
one’s undesired behavior it is natural to say that one did not know the conse-
quences if his or her actions, but should have thought that this undesired thing
would happen’ [16, p. 273].
6The fact that these are distinct is obvious in his deﬁnition of connective f:
A f B = A ! !B, and in Axiom III: (A f B) $ !(A ! B). With the help of
these Mally suggests the way how they can be expressed in terms of each other.
It is also clear that he sees the right parts of the two as equipollent, taking so
far their equipollency as innocuous for his system.
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Joergensen’s dilemma. Norms’ analysts widely recognize this dilem-
ma which amounts to the following. The practice of deﬁning log-
ical consequence in terms of satisﬁability rests on the assumption
that truth values are necessary properties of propositions describing
states of aﬀairs. Contrary to descriptive propositions, prescriptively
taken norms lack truth value. Consequently, either no logic of norms
proper is possible, or the idea of truth value based on the concept
of satisﬁability of propositions needs reconsideration. Most results
in logic of norms so far have been acquired in the framework of the
latter line.7
4 Willing, obligatoriness and norms in Mally’s
system
What concerns (2) Lokhorst suggests three sound reformulations of
Mally’s system and does so by proposing alternative non-deontic
bases that enrich Mally’s authentic system with additional pos-
tulates as well as by modifying some of Mally’s original axioms.
Lokhorst’s reconstructions result respectively in two versions of RD,
a relevant deontic system with the system R as its non-deontic part
[12] and RD with a propositional constant of andersonian type [15],
and KD, a version of standard von-Wright-type deontic system [12].
Mally has in mind three diﬀerent concepts of what obligatoriness
may mean when applied to a state of aﬀairs, to a conceptual (inten-
tional) object and to a relation among them respectively. Whereas
the ﬁrst and the third may be called norms in some sense, the second
deﬁnitely may not, for it is meant to express Mally’s philosophical
idea of rationally put human will which in order to be feasible should
be understood as a conceptual objec t and, consequently, as a log-
ically consistent object. Mally suggests his system for the sake of
showing how these distinct concepts logically relate to each other,
and obviously fails on this point because gets the three formally
confused.
Mally is aware of the fact that the three are distinct and holds
the view that each of them requires diﬀerent logic. The idea that
7For a survey of the development of logic of norms see [4]. [5] suggests an
outline of the development of the concept of norm in the framework of logic of
norms.
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the relations between norms and the propositions expressing the
conditions for them as well as norms’ obedience or disobedience
are non-truth-functional is plain in what Mally says when trying to
justify the ‘strange’ consequences’ his system yields. He is also very
accurate in distinguishing the types of implications, namely, formal
and material, especially when speaking of logical dependencies bet-
ween the three.
5 Mally’s Deontik
The non-deontic part of Mally’s system consists of the sentential
letters A, B, C, P and Q; the sentential variables M and N (these two
groups of symbols refer to states of aﬀairs); the sentential constants
V (the Verum, Truth) and  (the Falsum, Falsity); the propositional
quantiﬁers 9 and 8, and the connectives : , &, _, ! and $.  is
deﬁned by  = : V.
The deontic part of Mally’s vocabulary includes the unary con-
nective !, the binary connectives f and 1, and the sentential con-
stants [ and \. He supplies the deontic part of his system with the
following deﬁnitions:
Def. f . A f B = A ! !B.
Def. 1. A 1 B = (A f B) & (B f A)
Def. \. \ = : U
There are ﬁve axioms in Mally’s system. They are given in the
Table together with original Mally’s symbolisms and Lokhorst’s for-
malizations of them.
Basic principles Mally’s formal-ization
Lokhorst’s
formalization
i If A requires B and if B
then C, then A requires C.
((A f B) & (B!
C)) ! (A f C)
((A! !B) & (B!
C)) ! (A ! !C)
ii
If A requires B and if A re-
quires C, then A requires B
and C.
((A f B) & (A f
C))! (A f (B &
C))
((A! !B) & (A!
!C)) ! (A ! !(B
& C))
iii
A requires B if and only
if it is obligatory that if A
then B.
(A f B) $ !(A
! B)
(A ! !B) $ !(A
! B)
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iv
There is an unconditional-
ly obligatory which is
obligatory.
9U !U !U
v
The unconditionally obli-
gatory does not require its
own negation.
:(U f \) :(U ! !\)
Mally derived the following theorems from his axioms [16,
pp. 252–269].
(1) (A f B) ! (A f V)
(2) (A f ) $ 8M (A f M)
(3) ((M f A) _ (M f B)) ! (M f (A _ B))
(4) ((M f A) & (N f B)) ! ((M & N) f (A & B))
(5) !P $ 8M (M f P)
(6) (!P & (P ! Q)) ! !Q
(7) !P ! !V
(8) ((A f B) & (B f C)) ! (A f C)
(9) (!P & (P f Q)) ! !Q
(10) (!A & !B) $ !(A & B)
(11) (A 1 B) $ !(A $ B)
(12) (A f B) $ (A ! !B) $ !(A ! B) $ !:(A & :B) $ !(:A _
B)
(13) (A ! !B) $ :(A & :!B) $ (:A _ !B)
(14) (A f B) $ (:B f :A)
(15) 8M (M f U)
(16) (U ! A) ! !A
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(17) (U f A) ! !A
(18) !!A ! !A
(19) !!A $ !A
(20) (U f A) $ (A 1 U)
(21) !A $ (A 1 U)
(22) !V
(23) V 1 U
(23’) V f U
(24) A f A
(25) (A ! B) ! (A f B)
(26) (A $ B) ! (A 1 B)
(27) 8M (\ f :M)
(28) \ f \
(29) \ f U
(30) \ f 
(31) \ 1 
(32) :(U f )
(33) :(U ! )
(34) U $ V
(35) \ $ .
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6 ‘Surprising Consequences’ and conceptual objects
Mally sees his theorems (1), (2), (7), (22) and (27)–(35) as ‘surpris-
ing’ (befremdlich) or even ‘paradoxical’. Of these, (34) and (35) are
reported to be the most surprising of his surprising theorems. Some
of Mally’s explanations concerning the reasons for calling these the-
orems surprising are also puzzling [12]. Mally’s reasons for calling
some of his theorems surprising will not be discussed here.
The fact that theorems (23), (34) and (35) are derivable in Mally’s
system is clearly fatal for it. It has been pointed to by many deontic
logicians, f.i. Menger, von Wright, Follesdal and Hilpinen, and Lo-
khorst. Deﬁnitely, the system that states, for instance, that every
factual state of aﬀairs is obligatory and what is obligatory is the case
(34) has no chance to be accepted as a viable system. This totally
unacceptable result has a number of confusions as its background
and Mally’s peculiar idea of what a fact is also belongs to them.
Mally believes that state of aﬀairs, fact and object are distinct
from one another. A state of aﬀairs may be taken to be the meaning
of a sentence which expresses the corresponding judgment (Urteil)
but in this case the sentence is diﬀerent from the proposition taken
as propositional function. It is in the former sense that a proposi-
tion should be referred to as true (Tatsachen)8 or not true (Untat-
sachen), and this is distinct from how it is referred to in proposi-
tional logic, or the theory he calls logistic. ‘The concept of factual
state of aﬀairs (Tatbestand) lies in the background of the concept of
implication, and is a very important concept of thought; it cannot
be grasped unless applied to’ [16, p. 289].
Mally insists that logistic is a logic of propositional, or linguis-
tic forms, and is not logical theory proper, for propositional forms
themselves never become available for evaluation as being true and
false unless some facts, or actual states of aﬀairs, are understood
8Mally signiﬁcantly avoids speaking of truth (Warheit) and truthfulness in
his book. The reason for this may be that he has in mind a kind of intensional
semantic presuppositions for his system. This may serve an appropriate expla-
nation for the fact that in more or less the same signiﬁcant way Mally obviates
anything analogous to truth-functional logical semantics traditionally used in
propositional logic. In doing so he seems to understand such semantic presup-
positions as extensional and thus divergent from the semantic presuppositions
his object theory requires.
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as being described by them. ‘This is how the same rules are used
for indeﬁnite descriptions of states of aﬀairs and for real facts that
indeed may diﬀer from one another ’ [16, p. 236]. In other words,
Mally explicitly points that to say that a proposition is true is not
the same as to say that it describes what is the case, for whereas
being true as well as being not true are normally considered to be
properties of a proposition, describing what is the case is a property
of thought. The idea that our understanding of facts always occurs
after the facts themselves occur makes the regularities we notice in
material world obsolete, warns Mally in the Foreword of his book.
However, notwithstanding that it has occurred as a material truth,
once we make a conclusion that something is the case we take the
latter as formally necessary (richtig). It is in this sense that Mally
sees judgment and willing as formally necessary whenever the two
meet in fact [16, p. 229].
This is how Mally arrives at his three-fold distinction. There are
two groups of entities: propositions which in Mally’s version are
(contingent) linguistic forms, and states of aﬀairs (Sachverhalte)
which are kinds of conceptual objects capable of having factual
counterparts and which are referred to by sentential variables in
the non-deontic part of his system. The states of aﬀairs fall into
true and not true.
Throughout chapters I–II Mally diligently avoids telling what true
or non-true states of aﬀairs are. His key idea is that logic is a theory
about intensionally understood states of aﬀairs (Sachverhalte) and
thoughts (Denken), and it is lies in the very concept of correct
thought (richtige Denken) that it should grasp and model states of
aﬀairs and do so in order to unveil the nature of relations between
the states of aﬀairs and conceptual objects (Gegenstande) [16, p.
231]. Because applying a thought to a state of aﬀairs in diﬀerent
empirical cases may yield diverse results [16, p. 233], logic should
start with investigating what correct thought is. True (Tatsashe)
states of aﬀairs are those which are referred to by correct thought.
It is the relation between the two sorts of conceptual objects that
Mally places in the center of his peculiar ‘truth theory’, namely
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between what is thought to be a state of aﬀairs and a conceptual
object that is meant to correspond to it.9
7 Formalisms for conceptual objects
At this point one may easily notice the need for adequate symboli-
zation for this three-fold division in the non-deontic part of Mally’s
system, and elementary ﬁrst-order predicate logic seems to be an
appropriate candidate for this. In fact, Mally does an explicit step
towards using (monadic) predicate logic when proposing sentential
letters as symbols for states of aﬀairs (Tatbestand), sentential vari-
ables for any state of aﬀairs whatsoever (Sachverhalt) and sentential
constants V and for true (Tatsache) and  for not true (Untatsache)
states of aﬀairs. According to him, the relation between factual
(Falle x ) and conceptual states of aﬀairs (B(x)) (Sachverhalte) is
expressed in the judgment (Urteil) of the form
There is at least one x, for which B(x) is the case,
which may be evaluated as true or not true and which can be refor-
mulated so as to include all or some x respectively [16, p. 236–237].
Throughout chapter I he indeed tries to use sentential variables as
quantiﬁers but never goes beyond this point. Unfortunately, already
in these symbolisms his three-fold distinction turns de facto to be
expressed with the help of sentential variables only and thus gets
formally collapsed.
However, this is not the only confusion in the non-deontic part
of Mally’s system. Having introduced the idea of diﬀerent relations
that hold between facts and between conceptual objects Mally ap-
parently should have suggested some symbolisms that would exhibit
the diﬀerence. His attempts towards doing so are seen in the fact
9There should be a way of distinguishing between the two in order to establish
a sort of correspondence between these kinds of conceptual objects which are
clearly distinct for Mally. The borderline has to be looked for in Mally’s object
theory [22]. Conceptual objects do not necessarily instantiate the properties
they consist of; the former may be vague and logically inconsistent with respect
to the latter. The fact that such an intensional object matches its factual
instantiation is derivative from the fact that the object is sound in logical sense
[21].
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that he introduces material implication which is meant to hold be-
tween states of aﬀairs, A ! B, and a kind of formal implication,
A f B, which may be interpreted as the deontic version of standard
(aletic) formal implication, according to Def. f. Recalling now that
there is a confusion among kinds of objects expressed with the help
of sentential variables, letters and constants one gets a confusion
with connectives as derived out of the sentential confusion. There
seems to be a dilemma: drop the three-fold division and replace it
with just one object, either propositional or conceptual, or aban-
don the functional distinction materialnformal for implication. Had
Mally chosen either of the two lines for constructing the non-modal
part of his system, this would have prevented it from the collapse
just discussed. Disregarding the former and adopting the latter
would result in a system of formal implication; following the oppo-
site line, namely holding the former but not the latter leads to a
ﬁrst-order predicate system. Moreover, disregarding both gives a
version of classical propositional logic which could have served as a
basis for a kind of standard deontic logic. Mally adopts both in his
system and this leads him to further confusions.
8 Correct will as conceptual object
Judgments and volitions both refer to the states of aﬀairs but they
do so in a diﬀerent way, says Mally in the Introduction of his
book, and he proposes his Deontik as a theory of correct volition
[16, p. 233–234] as distinct from correct judgment which is studied
in non-modal logic.10 Mally believes that human volitions are also
conceptual objects and they stem out of deﬁnite state of aﬀairs,
for what is being wished in them is nothing but some other states
of aﬀairs which can be true (Tatsache) or not true (Untatsache)
[16, p. 279]. These conceptual objects serve as the content of in-
tentionally directed acts, for intentional acts are never deprived of
10‘Even though Mally regarded many of his theorems as surprising, he thought
that he had discovered an interesting concept of ‘correct willing’ (richtiges
Wollen) or ‘willing in accordance with the facts’ which should not be confused
with the notions of obligation and willing used in ordinary discourse. Mally’s
‘exact system of pure ethics’ was mainly concerned with this concept, but we
will not describe this system because it belongs to the ﬁeld of ethics rather than
deontic logic.’[12]
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their content. Because of the fact that there is always a conceptual
object that is determined by some properties, human beings’ voli-
tions may be rationally vague and inconsistent in logical sense but
this does not exclude a logical possibility for them to contingently
realize [16, p. 278].11
Contrary to not true states of aﬀairs their true counterparts are
capable of having their factual instantiations and this is so due
to the fact that these conceptual objects are always complete and
consistent. ‘Inasmuch logic does pursue inconsistent propositions
neither, so does not the Deontik in what concerns inconsistent and
untrue obligations’ [16, p. 248]. Only the volitions that are complete
and consistent may realize as true states of aﬀairs. ‘Consistency is
the key property of correct thought (richtigen Denken) and right will’
[16, p. 244]. This is the reason why Mally holds the view that any
correct volition should include all its implicates. In many places of
his book Mally insists that his Deontik is a logical theory of correct
volitions. This is also plain in his Axiom III and Theorems (6), (7),
(9). Inferential totality of correct volition is echoed in Mally’s idea
of human responsibility [16, p. 273. Cf. note 4 above].
There are two other notable features of Mally’s conception of
willing: that it is agential, but impersonal, and that it is conditional,
but in a very special way. Let us consider these properties in turn.
Mally proposes symbolism !A as ‘A ought to be the case’ (A soll
sein) or as ‘let A be the case’ (es sei A) in the sense that A is
a state of aﬀairs which is being wished by someone [16, p. 241].
Many Mally’s critics point to the fact that traditional deontic O-
symbol — be it taken as a connective, or as a sentential operator ––
is seldom read in this way [12; 10, p. 5–6]. Mally’s !A is agen-
tial, but impersonal and is goal oriented, but not action-dependent.
Therefore, it is small wonder that deontic O-symbol is seldom read
in the way Mally introduces his !A, for the two are originally meant
to symbolize diﬀerent entities.
11‘The improper will is an obvious demonstrative experience, for the improper
ought that wants to be an equivalent to the true state of aﬀairs seems itself to
be so only indirectly, namely through the reasoning which points to something
together with what out of which true state of aﬀairs follow’.
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Mally’s !A explicitly points to an obligatory state of aﬀairs and
seems to reject being interpreted as an obligatory action. On the
other hand, Mally uses his !A to express someone’s volition which
because of being desired becomes someone’s ought rather than ob-
ligation. Mally’s philosophical insights into the nature of volition
(Wollen) show that it is because of the fact that a volition is always
human volition it may become human ought in the sense that it
performs as a goal for human conduct at issue [16, p. 303–306]. It
is in this particular agential sense that Mally’s willing (Wollen) is
transformed by an agent into a kind of its personal ought (Sollen)
when choosing its particular strategy. Therefore, Mally’s !A is much
closer to the concept of agential choice and to an indeterministic
interpretation of agential strategic goal of the kind suggested in
stit-theories [11], or to what is understood by tactics in the deontic
logic of A.S. Esenin-Volpin [1], then to deterministic obligations of
the sort pursued the framework of the SDL and its developments. In
fact, it may be shown that stit-reconstruction of Mally’s Deontik is
also possible with the help of some minor renovations to his system.
This is why interpreting Mally’s !A as standard O-obligation would
hardly be the best choice.
From what has been said above concerning his concept of willing
it is clear now that only correct volition may turn into agential
ought. Def. f and Axiom III suggest that what is taken to be a
formal condition for the volition is also should be regarded as a
part of the intensional content of the volition at issue. In other
words, logical antecedent of the desired state of aﬀairs expressing
the (pre)condition of the volition is also part of this volition. On
the other hand, Theorem 5 says that correct volition is implied by
any state of aﬀairs whatsoever [16, p. 261]. Consequently, due
to the ideas that correct volition is implied by any state of aﬀairs
and that it should include all the consequences of the desired state
of aﬀairs, the concept of correct volition results in unconditional
and impersonal volition notwithstanding its start as conditional and
human depending. In the beginning Mally uses distinct symbolisms
to express ought and obligation: oughts as they are introduced by
Mally in the ﬁrst three postulates are diﬀerent from obligations
given in the Axioms V and IV.
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In doing so Mally again starts with proposing important distinct-
ions, namely, between agential strategic ought and conditional obli-
gation, but because of his idea of correct volition which should not
only imply all its consequences but its antecedents as well, he ﬁnally
drops the distinction just introduced and arrives at an ill-formed
mixture of the two. This confusion results in a problematic outcome
that in his philosophical explanations Mally’s volition (Wollen) is
gradually transformed into ought (Sollen) [16, p. 276 and ﬀ],12
what apparently does conform with what he says when introducing
his !A [16, p. 241]13 in agential indeterministic perspective. But
after that, when the idea that agential indeterministic ought is said
to include all its consequents, but to follow to the state of aﬀairs
which has the predominant chances to happen,14 things de facto
go wrong and agential ought is turned into a sort of unconditional
obligation [16, p. 299–301, axiom IV].15 Thus, at this point the
distinction is corrupted. Mally is aware of these transformations
and he notoriously purports to explain them by pointing to his idea
that in order to be capable of being realized the volition should be
complete and consistent, but this consideration does not help much
here.
Having introduced his illuminative and fertile of further deve-
lopments concept of agential volition !A, Mally could have subse-
quently developed a kind of indeterministic logic of norms, had he
12‘In terms of the will, it lies in the very sense of the volition, that to say that
the desired state of aﬀairs ought to be is to say that there ought to be any state
of aﬀairs in absence of which that which is desired may not happen’.
13‘This ought, precisely the ought of the deﬁnite state of aﬀairs, corresponds
to the will as to a counterpart conceptual object: it describes the object, namely
the state of aﬀairs, to which the will is directed’.
14‘This is how the judgment and the subsequent decision come to be correct:
they are materially correct, if they both keep to the true state of aﬀairs; they
are formally correct, if they have been taken in the sense of the predominant
possibility, therefore, have themselves proved to happen’ [16, p. 300].
15‘The requirement of formal correctness, enjoining what is of man as a voli-
tional essence requires and may be reasonably required: to satisfy the require-
ments of substantive correctness to the best of knowledge. The requirements of
formally correct will specify an ideal: to fulﬁll the aim, which cannot be required
as necessary proper, it is necessary to keep to these requirements rigorously and
unconditionally’ [16, p. 301].
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abandoned the idea that correct volition should imply all the con-
sequents of itself, or keep to what is logically necessary, but he did
not. On the basis of the same concept he also could have developed
a kind of (non-agential) deterministic deontic logic, had he dropped
the idea that correct volition should include all its antecedents, or
stem out of the deﬁnite state of aﬀairs, but he did not, too. Instead
he preserved both and once again arrived at a collapsing confusion
of ought and obligation in the deontic part of his Deontik. This is
particularly the reason for his ‘strange’ Theorem 22 which yields yet
more strange consequences.
9 Unconditional obligation
Apart from volitions Mally introduces another kind of obligation,
unconditional obligation U (das unbedingt Geforderte, das Sollens-
gemaesse) which is seen as distinct from !A because of the fact that
the latter is agential and conditional. Unconditional constant U
and its negation \ seem to be very close to Kangerian Q-constant
which is meant to express a normative code. The diﬀerence between
Kangerian Q and Mally‘s U lies in the idea that Mally takes his
deontic constant to refer to the obligatory states of aﬀairs whereas
Kangerian Q depict an actual normative code.
It is tempting to call the negation of U, \, unconditionally forbid-
den (das unbedingt Verbotene). In some places of his book Mally
occasionally does so [16, p. 296–297], but as a whole the notions of
forbidden and permitted are not to be found in his book. The reason
for this according to Mally lies in two important facts concerning
the issue. The ﬁrst is that unconditionally obligatory is a conceptual
object and as such is necessarily applied to a state of aﬀairs. The
second is that unconditional obligation is agent-free, or agent-inde-
pendent. The concepts of permission and prohibition seem not to
belong to the domain of the Deontik which is seen as logic of correct
willing. In this system, prohibition (verkert-U, Sollenswidrige) is
just the counterpart of unconditionally obligatory and is not an
object [16, p. 250].
When introducing his deontic constant U Mally speaks of a kind
of positive obligation and its negation and he takes the former to
be consistent and actual unconditionally obligatory state of aﬀairs,
24 Elena N. Lisanyuk
though, perhaps, in his view of conceptual objects to say that a
state of aﬀairs is consistent and actual would be redundant. Un-
conditionally obligatory never implies what is incompatible to it, or
its negation. Consequently, the negation of U, or \, is principally
unobtainable as a state of aﬀairs because of its inconsistency. This
leads us to the conclusion that it is not quite correct to take Mally’s
deontic constant \ as unconditionally forbidden of the same sort as
unconditionally obligatory.
Agent-dependency is the background of the distinction between
Mally’s ought and (unconditional) obligation. He draws a borderline
between obligation which he regards as deﬁnitive and independent
of personal representations (objective Bestimmtheit) in the sense of
(2) and ought which is an agential goal and thus may be vague and
even inconsistent (subjective Unbestimmtheit) [16, p. 280–281] in
the sense of (3)–(4). Axiom IV says that social agents in outlining
the trends of their behavior take into account that there exist some
(legal or moral) norms. This is not to say that these obligations
exist independently of agents, but just that they are not agential
ones.
In his purports to introduce a kind of deontologically understood
obligation, Mally apparently falls into the trap which he has pre-
pared for himself when diligently avoiding any semantic considera-
tions and carelessly following his object theory. In the deontic part
of his system (Axiom IV) Mally would like to propose an objectively
interpreted obligation and for this reason he speaks of !U — ‘uncon-
ditional demand as a principle of actuality of obligation (Grundsatz
der Tatsaechlichkeit des Sollens)’ 9U !U [16, p. 249] — not only as
of existing independently of social agents, but just of the one that
exist.
And the trap shuts. Indeed, his idea of true states of aﬀairs
as logically consistent conceptual objects taken together with the
corrupted formal distinction between the conceptual objects which
are capable of having factual instantiations and those that are not
(see section 7 and note 9 above) results in that formally there is
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simply no room for any other kinds of conceptual objects to be
taken as existing in the non-modal part of his Deontik.16
Neither there is any in the deontic part of his system. Agential
ought, when taken altogether with all its consequents in the determi-
nistic way (see section 8 above), clearly overlaps with unconditional
obligation. This is the philosophical background for Mally’s ‘most
surprising consequences’ (34)–(35), which follow out of his Theorem
22 [16, p. 269].
10 Conclusion
In his Deontik Mally has made a number of powerful distinctions
signiﬁcant in what regards logic of norms. These are the distinctions
between
a) Actual, or material, and intensional, or formal states of aﬀairs;
b) Material and formal implications as holding in the case of two
mentioned in a);
c) Agential ought and obligation.
All the distinctions are grounded in his object theory and have
proved to be crucial to the development of the logic of norms after
Mally. In 1926, the ideas of (a) and (b) were already known in
the logical community [6], but he is apparently a pioneer of the
idea of (c)-distinction which has started to be developed in the
logical systems of norms in the last decades of the XXth century.
Unfortunately, in his formalisms he got all the three distinctions
confused and this led to the system’s collapse. However, in the
paper, more evidence is suggested to support the thesis that Mally’s
pioneering eﬀort deserves rehabilitation rather than contempt [12].
16This is particularly why Lokhorst sees Mally’s Axiom IV as redundant [12].
However, his suggestion to replace it with !U will turn Mally’s unconditional
obligation into unconditional agential ought.
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